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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court over this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3 (2)(c), Utah Code Annotated, is not disputed.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case is an appeal from a final judgment and order
of the Third Circuit Court, Murray Department, entered by the
Honorable L.H. Griffiths, dated December 15, 1988.
The Court found the attempted Reaffirmation Agreement in
question to be void, being violative of Section 524 of the
Bankruptcy

Code,

and

awarded

judgment

against

the

plaintiff/appellant, Utah State Credit Union, in the sum of
$3,239.00 together with costs.

Costs were fixed at $25.00

making the total judgment $3,264.00.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Must the Order of the trial Court be vacated for

failure of the trial Court to make written Findings of Fact
or Conclusions of Law?
II.

Were defendants/respondents correctly held entitled

to a refund of sums paid to the plaintiff/appellant under an
invalid reaffirmation agreement?
III. Was the Court correct in holding the payments in
question not voluntary.
1

IV.

Is the issue of the proper measure of damages in

this matter properly before this Court, it never having been
plead, presented or argued to the trial Court,

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
In addition to the statutes applicable to this question
as set forth by the appellant, Respondents will rely on:
30-2-1, Utah Code Annotated: Real and personal estate of
every female acquired before marriage, and all property to
which she may afterwards become entitled by purchase, gift,
grant, inheritance, bequest or devise, shall be and remain the
estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable
for the debts, obligations or engagements of her husband, and
may be conveyed, devised or bequeath by her as if she were
unmarried.
30-2-2 Utah Code Annotated: Contracts may be made by a
wife, and liabilities incurred and enforced by or against her,
to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were
unmarried.
30-2-4 Utah Code Annotated: A wife may receive the wages
for her personal labor, maintain an action therefor in her
own name an hold the same in her own right, and may prosecute
and defend all actions for the preservation and protection of

2

her rights and property as if unmarried.

There shall be no

right of recovery by the husband on account of personal injury
or wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected there with,
but the wife may recover against a third person for such
injury or wrong as if unmarried, and such recovery shall
include expenses of medical treatment and other expenses paid
or assumed by the husband.
30-2-5 Utah Code Annotated: Neither husband nor wife is
liable for the debts or liabilities of the other incurred
before marriage, and, except as herein otherwise declared,
they are not liable for the debts of each other contracted
after marriage; nor or the wages, earnings, or property of
either, or the rents or income of the property of either,
liable for the separate debts of the other.
Rule 52(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Except in

actions for divorce, Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law
may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear in at the trial.
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause.
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the
minutes.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Prior to August, 1985, respondent William L. Gregg (Karen
R. Gregg is not genuinely before the Court), secured a number
3

of loans from appellant Utah State Credit Union, hereinafter
"USCU".

Some loans were unsecured, and some were secured by

a 1978 Fiat automobile and a 1984 Honda motorcycle.
p. 2)

(Trans,

Karen Gregg was not originally obligated on all such

obligations. (Trans, p. 29)
On August 9, 1985, respondents

filed a petition in

bankruptcy under the provisions of Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy
code. Due to a mistake on the part of the bankruptcy counsel,
Karen Gregg did not appear at the Section 341 Meeting of
Creditors

and

the

Bankruptcy

Court,

for

that

reason,

bifurcated the case and dismissed the proceeding as to Karen
Gregg.

During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding,

appellant attempted to create a reaffirmation agreement as to
the obligations owing to them and requested that the Greggs
appear at the Credit Union offices for that purpose. (Trans,
p. 31) What was actually presented was a new promissory note,
representing a consolidation of all of the pre-existing, prepetition dischargeable obligations, which William Gregg signed
on or about October 10, 1985, and which Karen Gregg signed on
or about October 17 or 19, 1985.

This occurred prior to the

entry of the discharge order as to respondent William Gregg.
That order was entered November 22, 1985.
It is not disputed and, in fact, was stipulated by the
appellant

at

the

trial

below

that

as

a

reaffirmation

agreement, the new note and disclosure statement was
4

absolutely invalid as it failed to comply in any way with the
reaffirmation requirements of the United States Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C., Section 524.
Within approximately 30 day after respondent signed the
note in question, the Fiat automobile became inoperable, and
the motorcycle was unusable, due to the winter cold, and
neither vehicle was driven or used by respondent thereafter.
(Trans, p. 9)

Respondent Karen R. Gregg in any event never

used the vehicles, as she is not even a licensed driver.
(Trans, p. 12)
Respondent William Gregg made payments on the obligation,
quite irregularly (Trans, pp. 20, 21, 22, 25) until about
March, 1987.

The vehicles were repossessed, and the Credit

Union obtained a value of $1,150.00 from sale of the vehicles,
and it is not disputed

that the Credit Union was paid

$3,239.00 in cash for a total of payments under the note in
question of $4,389.00.

(Trans, p. 29)

William Gregg made all of the payments himself from his
separate funds.

Mrs. Gregg, who has a separate income from

child care services, made no payments of any kind.

(Trans,

pp. 4, 6)
Following the repossession, appellant brought action in
the trial Court below against respondents to collect all
amounts

allegedly

due

reaffirmation agreement.

under

the

terms

of

the

invalid

William Gregg counterclaimed for
5

recovery of sums paid under the reaffirmation agreement which
was invalid.

Prior to trial, respondent Karen Gregg filed a

new petition in bankruptcy.
In

response

to

plaintiff/appellant•s

Complaint,

respondent William Gregg had initially filed a pro se response
in the nature of a counterclaim, requesting refund, and
asserting the invalidity of the reaffirmation agreement. Only
then did the plaintiff/appellant dismiss as to William Gregg,
and appellant filed a motion to dismiss the pro se claim for
failure to state a claim. Counsel then entered appearance on
behalf of respondent William Gregg and filed an answer and
counterclaim.
With the dismissal of plaintiff/appellant's complaint
against respondent William Gregg, and the filing of the
bankruptcy petition by respondent Karen Gregg, the only issue
remaining for trial was respondent William Gregg's claim
against the appellant credit union.
The case was tried to the Court without a jury on October
4, 1988.

The trial Court took the matter under advisement,

and by memorandum decision dated December 9, 1988, and by
order and judgment dated December 15, 1988, held the attempted
reaffirmation to be invalid and awarded judgment in favor of
respondent William Gregg in the sum of $3,239.00 together with
costs.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lack of generation by the trial Court of a document
formally titled Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does
not require vacation of the Order and Judgment in this matter.
Respondent William Gregg was clearly entitled under
applicable law, to refund of cash paid to the credit union
pursuant to the invalid reaffirmation agreement.
The fact that the co-signer in this case was Karen Gregg,
wife of William Gregg, is of no significance. Under the laws
of the State of Utah, she is entitled to her separate income
and property, and appellant is in no better position as to her
than it would be as to unrelated co-signer.
There was no evidence presented

at trial regarding

alleged pooling of funds by respondents, and appellant may not
argue that for the first time in this Court.
The time and manner in which the appellant attempted to
obtain this reaffirmation, and their manner of proceeding
thereafter, made the payments which respondent William Gregg
made to them clearly not voluntary.
The amounts of payments made and the value of the
vehicles repossessed was not disputed by the parties, and the
argument appellant now makes, regarding value of depreciation
was neither pleaded, proven or argued to the Court below and
therefore may not be considered by this Court.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
LACK OF FORMAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DOES NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL OR VACATION OF JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE
It is, of course, true that in this matter, no separate
document titled Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was
prepared.

Rule 52(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does

provide that except in actions for divorce, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law may be waived by the parties either by
default, or by failing to appear at the trial; by consent in
writing, filed in the cause; or by oral consent in open Court
entered in the minutes.
Appellant herein did not, prior to filing Notice of
Appeal, request specific findings and conclusions or object
to the lack thereof. Respondent is, at this point, not aware
of any Utah decision construing waiver by default, but it
appears arguable that where the appellant did, in fact, fail
to object or request findings and has fully briefed and argued
the case to this Court, appellant has, by default, waived such
findings.
Further, it has been held by our Court that even in
situation where a waiver is definitely not permissible, if a
waiver is attempted, or no steps are taken at the trial level
to obtain findings and conclusions, an appellant should not
be allowed to try to take advantage of the lack of findings
8

and conclusions on appeal by demanding reversal. Farrell vs.
Turner, 482 P.2d 117 (Utah, 1971).
The most compelling reason, however, why the lack of
entry of formal findings and conclusions does not mandate
reversal or vacate the order here, is that the trial Court's
decision

was

based

in

large

part

upon

stipulated

and

undisputed facts.
It has long been held in this jurisdiction that a
memorandum decision of the Court can be regarded as Findings
of Fact.

Thomas vs. Thomas, 569 F.2d

1119

(Ut. 1977).

Further, this Court in the case of Dover Elevator vs. Hill
Mangum Investment, 766 P.2d 424 (Ut. App., 1988), ruled that
while ordinarily, failure to comply with Rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, would be reversible error,
where facts are stipulated, that is the functional equivalent
of findings, and where such facts therefore do not turn on
witness credibility, the appellate Court has the same means
as did the trial Court of reaching correct Conclusions of Law.
Similarly, lack of formal Conclusions of Law is not reversible
error where the appellate Court can look at the undisputed
facts

and

make

its

own

determinations

of

the

proper

Conclusions of Law.
In this case, the following facts were either stipulated
or undisputed, as shown by the transcript of the trial below:

9

Prior to August, 1985, obligations were owing to the
appellant Utah State Credit Union, some secured, some not.
(Trans, p. 2)
Respondent Karen Gregg was not originally obligated on
all prior obligations (Trans, p. 29);
On August 9, 1985, respondents filed a petition under
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code;
On or about October 10 and/or 17 or 19, respondents were
requested by and went to the appellant's offices to sign what
they thought was a reaffirmation, but which was in fact simply
a new promissory note constituting a consolidation of all of
the prior obligations;
All of the obligations included in the consolidation were
prepetition obligations.
The procedure used in obtaining respondents1 signatures
on the note did not comply with the requirements of the United
States

Bankruptcy

Code,

11 U.S.C.

Section

524, and as

reaffirmation was completely invalid;
Respondent William Gregg was granted discharge November
22, 1985;
That about 30 days after the signing of the new note, the
automobile became inoperable and the motorcycle was unusable
due to the winter cold, and neither vehicle was used or driven
thereafter (Trans, p. 9) (appellant argued, and here argues
that respondents had the possession and use of the vehicles
10

for a year and a half after the signing, but presented no
evidence on that point);
Respondent Karen Gregg never used the vehicles, not being
a licensed driver.

(Trans, pg. 12);

Appellant repossessed the vehicles and realized $1,150.00
from the sale of said vehicles;
In addition to the value obtained on repossession,
appellant was paid the sum of $3,239.00 in cash;
The payments that were made, were made irregularly;
That the appellant, following the signing, and prior to
repossession, contacted respondents many times to compel
payments.

(Trans, pp. 15, 20-22)

Payments were made solely by respondent William Gregg
from his separate earnings. (Trans, pg. 4, 6)
That the appellant, even after repossession and sale,
initiated suit to enforce the terms of the note.
From the above stated stipulated and undisputed facts,
there is no question but that this Court is in as good as
position as was the trial Court to make conclusions, and there
is simply no need to reverse the trial Court, vacate the
judgment, or remand for any further proceedings.

11

POINT II
RESPONDENT WAS CORRECTLY HELD ENTITLED TO REFUND OF
CASH PAID UNDER THE INVALID REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENT
Courts that have been presented with situations similar
to that presented in this case, have directed that when a
creditor

receives

payments

pursuant

to

an

invalid

reaffirmation, the debtor is entitled to refund of those sums.
In the case of In Re: Mandrel 1, 50 BR 593 (B. Tenn 1985),
the Court found that when a debtor had entered

into a

reaffirmation agreement under the mistaken impression that the
creditor in that case, Ford Motor Credit, had a valid security
agreement which was set aside as an invalid preference by the
bankruptcy trustee, that the debtor was entitled to a refund
of the money so paid.

In that case, even though the debtor

had for some unspecified amount of time had possession of the
use of the vehicle in question, since the security agreement
was invalid, the creditor was not even entitled to the value
of the security, although that, of course, is not in question
here.
A similar result seems to have occurred in the case of
In Re: Gardner, 57 BR 609 (B Md. 1986), there, the debtor, a
Certified Public Accountant, was sued in State Court for
malpractice, along with his partnership. The Bankruptcy Court
had granted relief from the stay to enable the State Court to

12

determine whether the debtor's insurance carrier would have
to pay any judgment.

Negotiation between the State Court,

plaintiff and the carrier resulted in the parties being some
$4,500.00

apart

from

settlement.

The debtor

voluntarily

agreed to pay that amount, depositing $1,500.00 in escrow, and
agreeing to sign a note for the remaining $3,000.00.

Later,

the debtor decided to rescind that agreement and demanded
refund of the $1,500.00.
The creditors in that case argued that since the debtor
had

voluntarily

entered

into

the

agreement

and made

the

payments, and received new consideration, that he should be
held to the terms of the agreement.

The Bankruptcy Court

ruled that even if the debtor's actions were voluntary, and
even

if he had

matter.

received

new consideration, that did not

The procedures for a valid reaffirmation were not

followed, and the agreement was void.

Although the reported

opinion did not make it exactly clear, it appears that the
creditors were reguired to refund the $1,500.00, as the report
indicated

that an Order to appropriate

to the claim

for

relief, which included refund of that sum, would be entered.
Further, in the case entitled Matter of Gilliland, 62 BR
587

(B Neb. 1986), the Court had before it a case guite

similar to the present proceeding.

Debtors had signed new

notes, post-petition and post-discharge.

As here, proper

procedures for obtaining a valid reaffirmation agreement were
13

not followed.

Some payments were made, but after default,

the creditor in question obtained a judgment in State Court
for the balance due. The debtors went back to the Bankruptcy
Court and demanded refund of the sums paid, as well as
attorney's fees and other relief.
That Court ruled that where the purported consideration
for the new note was in whole or in part pre-petition
obligations, dischargeable debts, that to be enforceable, the
reaffirmation agreement had to follow all of the statutory
requirements.

If those

requirements were not met, the

agreements were void and the creditor had to return the
payments made by the debtors, but was allowed to retain or
take possession of the property that was subject to security
interest.
On the point of returning to that creditor the property
subject

to

the

security

interest,

the

Gilliland

Court

indicated that the debtors were simply to return to the
creditor whatever remained of the collateral.

The bank in

question would not be allowed to benefit from non-compliance
with Section 524, because, said the Court, to do otherwise
would allow creditors to tell a debtor that the debtor could
keep collateral only if the debtor would resign on prior
obligations, which the Court ruled would be contrary to the
policies of the statute.

14

Appellant cites two bankruptcy court decisions to this
Court allegedly for the proposition that the appellant should
be allowed to keep the respondents1 money, In Re: Klappf 80
BR 540 (B. W.D. Ok. 1987), and In Re: Whitaker, 85 BR 788 (B.
E.D. Tenn. 1988).

Neither of those decisions stand for the

propositions that the appellant would here advance.
In the Klapp decision, involving a ruling in objection
to plan, the debtors were working on paying in Chapter 13 a
debt that had already been discharged in a prior Chapter 7.
The objecting creditors were contending in effect that they
could hold the mortgage securing the discharged debt over the
head of the debtors, to virtually coerce "voluntary" payments
under the original

obligation

and

that

at any time

such

payments became in default, foreclose the mortgage.

The

Bankruptcy Court did not allow that result and in that case,
the debtors, unlike respondents here, were allowed to keep the
property, real estate, which had secured the obligation, and
pay the debt in Chapter 13.
In

Whitaker, supra, the Court did not even come close

to holding that the creditor in guestion could retain payments
made by the debtor.
redemption

of

reaffirmation,

the

In that case, there had been neither
collateral,

whether

valid

or

nor

had

there

invalid.

The

been

a

debtors,

contending they were not in default on their obligation, had
been making payments to the creditor all along.
15

The court did

find that the filing of the bankruptcy in and of itself could
have constituted default under the terms of the note in
question and ruled that the debtor would have to choose
between either a redemption or attempt to enter into a
valid reaffirmation

agreement.

There was absolutely no

indication in that opinion as to what would have happened or
what did happen, had the debtor decided to surrender the
vehicle.

That case is simply not applicable.

In another recent decision in a case somewhat similar to
the present controversy, the Court in In Re: Kenderick, 75 BR
451 (B. N.D Ga. 1987), ruled that the debtor in that case had
to give back a vehicle that secured his obligation, but that
the creditor had to refund to the debtor all funds it had in
excess of the value of the vehicle as of the time of the
discharge.
Clearly, respondent William Gregg was entitled under the
undisputed facts and the law applicable to those facts to a
refund of the cash he had paid to the appellant herein.
Appellant here attempts to argue that refund should not
have been granted because it was entitled to collect from
respondent Karen Gregg prior to her filing a new petition
under some theory of the respondents1 money being pooled in
a joint bank account.
There was no evidence presented to the trial court of any
pooling of funds in any kind of joint account.
16

The sole

evidence on that point was the proffer and testimony of
William Gregg which was that payments were made solely by him
by

his

separate

earnings

contribution thereto.

and

that

his

wife

made

no

It has long been the rule in this

jurisdiction that matters not admitted in evidence before the
trier of fact will not be considered on appeal to this Court.
Utah Department of Transportation vs. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814
(Ut. 1979); Ebbert vs. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Ut. App. 1987).
The appellant attempts to present these facts to the
Court by attaching to its brief two exhibits, denominated A
and B, neither of which were offered or introduced in the
trial court.

This the appellant cannot do.

Documents not

part of the trial court record cannot be considered on appeal.
Chapman vs. Chapman, 728 P. 2d 121 (Ut. 1986); attaching a
document to an appellate brief does not make the document part
of the record.

Blodgett vs. Zions Fist National Bank, 752

P.2d 901 (Ut. App. 1988), (footnote 1 at pg. 903, citing
Watkins vs. Simonds, 14 UT 2nd 406, 386 P.2d 154 (1963).
The Beehive State Bank vs. Rosequist, 21 Ut. 2nd Ut. 17,
439 P.2d 468 (1968), and Peterson vs. Peterson, 571 P.2d 1360
(Ut.

1977), decisions cited by the appellant do not, in

respondent's view hold as appellant represents; they are
nevertheless, irrelevant.

The only evidence on the question

was undisputed that the payments were from respondent William
Gregg's separate funds. Appellant would argue that this is
17

a fiction created by the appellants, but the contrary is the
case.
Utah law provides, in Section 30-2-4 & 5, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended), that wife is perfectly within her
rights to earn her separate wages and maintain her separate
funds.

As a co-signer, Mrs. Gregg may have, absent her new

petition in bankruptcy, been separately obligated on the note,
but in that respect is in no different a position than would
be an unrelated co-signer.

Had the co-signer, in fact, been

unrelated, the result as to respondent William Gregg would
have been and should have been no different.

POINT III
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
PAYMENTS MADE WERE NOT VOLUNTARY
As noted, neither of the vehicles involved in this case
were used beyond about 30 days following the signing of the
new note.
Also, it was not disputed that the total amount of the
new obligation included consolidation of pre-existing notes
that had never been secured. Appellant was seeking to compel
payment of several obligations, default on which would result
in further legal action.
Respondent continued to try to make payments, believing
at the time that he was under legal compulsion to do so by way
18

of the new note, and being concerned about further legal
action being taken.
Further, the respondents were contacted many times by the
Credit Union regarding payments on the loan, which had been
made

rather

irregularly,

and

were more

often

than not

delinquent. (Trans, pp. 14 & 15) Appellant, in fact, sent a
representative to the trial to testify regarding collection
efforts and contacts with the respondents in an effort to
enforce the terms of the note.

The appellant, according to

its representative's testimony (Trans, pg. 22) was aware at
least as early as December 31, 1986, that the Fiat automobile
was

not

running,

but

collection

efforts, nevertheless,

continued.
Following default, the appellant then not only took
possession of the collateral and sold it, but then instituted
legal action to attempt to compel payment by both respondents.
Appellant protests that because, (only after respondents filed
a pleading in the Court below setting forth discharge, in
validity

of

reaffirmation

agreement

and

seeking

refund)

appellant caused the claim against respondent William Gregg
to be dismissed, that they were doing nothing to force or
compel payments and that, ipso facto, payments made were made
voluntarily.
It is perhaps to ask this Court to indulge in speculation
as to what the appellant would have done in terms of
19

collection efforts had no responsive pleading never been filed
in the Court below, but the fact remains that following the
signing of this new note (which, of course had been on the
pretext that it was to be a reaffirmation agreement) the
appellant made continual contact with the respondents to
enforce payments, even up to filing suit against them. Under
such circumstances, how the payments that were made can be
argued

to

have

been

voluntary

is

beyond

respondents'

understanding.
In fact, in that respect, this case was very similar to
what the Court found in the case In Re: Klapp, supra, a
decision cited by the appellant, and which is instructive on
the question of voluntariness.
The facts of that decision were discussed in detail
above, and will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say, that
in that case, as here, creditors were using the threat of
foreclosure to compel payment.
Here, the respondents were asked to, as a condition of
trying to keep a couple of motor vehicles, sign a new
obligation which included clearly dischargeable unsecured
notes and then exerted pressure on them to pay the full
amounts.
In Re: Whitaker, supra, also cited by the appellant, is
also not explicable in this situation.

In that case, there

had been neither an attempt at redemption nor a reaffirmation.
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POINT IV
ft PPELLANT'S ATTEMPT TO ASSERT IMPROPER MEASURE OF
Di \1 IAGES WAS NOT PRESENTED IN ANY FORM TO TRIAL COURT
AND MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL

3.

Appellant, in Point II of this argument, now asserts for
the first time that the Trial Court used the wrong standard
for determine damages, and argues that appellant should be
compensated some depreciation value of the collateral from
the date of the bankruptcy filing.
At the trial below, the case was presented to the Trial
Court by the parties stipulating that the value of the
collateral

at the time of

sale was

$1,150.00

and that

respondent had made cash payments in addition to that totaling
$3,239.00 and tried the case, based on those figures, on the
theories of whether respondent was entitled to refund of that
amount of cash due to the admittedly invalid attempt at
reaffirmation; and whether the appellant could retain the cash
because the payments were voluntary.
No other measure of damage issue was either pleaded or
argued by appellant.
In Lance vs. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Ut. 1086), the Court
ruled that issues not raised by pleading and not addressed to
the Trial Court cannot be considered on appeal.

the matter

was stated quite appropriately in Combe vs. Warren's Family
Drive Ins, Inc. , 680 P.2d 733 (Ut. 1984), where it stated that
the Court cannot adjudicate issues not raised before or during
trial and unsupported by the record.
The Court went on to hold:
"The Court may not grant judgment for relief
which is neither requested by pleading nor
22

withii i theory on which the case was tried,
whether that theory was expressly stated
or implied by proof adduced . . . The parties
may limit the scope of litigation if they
choose, and if an issue is clearly withheld,
the Court cannot, nevertheless, adjudica' *--* "+and grant corresponding relief."
5 80 I 2- i ; 33, ; 3 6
_ issue n ot may n ow be presented to this Coi irt „

CONCLUSION

Court .a'ju.v. be dffirmed

t ui

respects for * te

.^,uing

reasons:
1.

f
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..i^ii.5 were unnecessary in

this case given the stipulated ana i:v.disputed facts upon wl lich
the Trial CM--* ' <?eci:;b"t was "art
2.
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reaffirm/it inn

and the p a y m e n t s

3.

*.... .i.p.icdi^o

to itjf-.jnd of the
. t«

IMMMIII'I

havmq

it

in

IJIH

•: o ^ n
funo.-»
'.!

case^f
!

ha*

respondent

*•*- -a i P - *
J

JI
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On t*--- ssues o«'*ua: y ''r^^f^e < * • ^ ~'<i tried by the

C
Respondents

therefor*--

'especttuily

request

that

the

judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed, and thai, this court

23

award

respondent

costs

and

such

other

relief

as

is

appropriate.

DATED this A/ ^ day of

/^^•»/

, 1989.

' "7
Respectfully Submitted,

$f WAYNJ^ GILLMAN
Attorney for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ^ / "^ day
of
copies

" ^>ar > V~
of

the

, 1989, four true and correct
foregoing

document

were

served

appellant by delivering the same to the following:
Dale R. Kent
McKay, Burton & Thurman
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
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